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Abstract
Parenting decisions are among the most consequential choices people
make throughout their lives. Starting with the work of pioneers such as
Gary Becker, economists have used the toolset of their discipline to under-
stand what parents do and how parents’ actions affect their children. In
recent years, the literature on parenting within economics has increasingly
leveraged findings and concepts from related disciplines that also deal with
parent-child interactions. For example, economists have developed models
to understand the choice between various parenting styles that were first ex-
plored in the developmental psychology literature, and have estimated de-
tailed empirical models of children’s accumulation of cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills in response to parental and other inputs. In this paper, we survey
the economic literature on parenting and point out promising directions for
future research.
Keywords: Parenting, parenting style, skill acquisition, peer effects, altruism,
paternalism.
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1 Introduction
Among the distinct characteristics of humans is extraordinarily slow develop-
ment. We are born helpless, and then go through a prolonged phase of child-
hood and adolescence before reaching full maturity decades into our lives. As a
consequence, young humans depend on their parents. Child rearing or parent-
ing refers to everything parents do to support the development of their children,
from basics such as providing food and shelter to guiding their emotional and
intellectual development.
While some time ago parenting was mostly studied in other social sciences such
as sociology and developmental psychology, in recent years a large literature on
parenting has developed within economics. In part, this reflects the growing
reach of economics, which in the case of parenting goes back to Gary Becker’s
work on the family.1 However, an equally important factor is that recent research
has shown parenting decisions to have profound economic implications. In mod-
ern economies, about two-thirds of total income goes to workers as wages, and
most of this income reflects the return to accumulated human capital rather than
“raw” labor. A key factor in the accumulation of human capital, in turn, is par-
enting decisions that start in the very first years of life and continue through a
child’s development to adulthood. Economists who want to study the role of hu-
man capital in economic development, determinants of social mobility, and the
drivers of long-run inequality must take parenting decisions into account.
Choices that matter for parenting start long before a child is born. In the mar-
riage market, for example, one criterion in choosing a partner is what she or he
has to offer in terms of expected future investments in children. A number of pa-
pers on the economics of marriage analyze how future parenting plans affect pre-
marital investments and the matching patterns in the marriage market.2 In turn,
these choices influence the parenting choices that take place after a relationship
is formed. Even more directly, the choice of how to raise each individual child is
closely linked to the choice of how many children to have in the first place. One
of the central concepts in the economics of fertility is Becker’s quantity-quality
1See Becker (1981).
2See, for example, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017).
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tradeoff, i.e., the notion that a larger number of children (quantity) tends to lower
investment in each individual child (quality).3 This tradeoff is inevitable in par-
ticular in regard to parents’ time: for parents with many children, it is simply
not possible to spend hours of one-on-one time each day with each individual
child, whereas parents of only children have more flexibility. Fertility and other
parenting decisions are therefore closely linked.
Nevertheless, in this survey we focus more narrowly on child-rearing decisions
that take place after parents have formed a relationship and have had a child. In
part, this is because the economics of marriage and fertility has a longer history
and a number of surveys are available.4 Moreover, up to now the literatures on
marriage, fertility, and narrowly defined parenting have mostly developed in iso-
lation, with a lack of research that considers, say, a joint decision involving how
many children to have and with which parenting style to raise them. We believe
considering interactions between different choices that affect child rearing to be
an important direction for future research, and we discuss some specific issues
(such as the role of single parenting) at the end of the paper.
We develop our discussion of the economic literature on “post birth” parenting
around three main themes. First, we focus on the choice of a “parenting style.”
The term parenting style stems from developmental psychology, and refers to the
broad strategies that parent follow in raising their children, such as an obedience-
based “authoritarian” style versus “permissive” parenting that grants more inde-
pendence to children. We describe how the economics of parenting can be used
to derive predictions on how economic conditions affect the choice of parenting
style, and we point to empirical evidence suggesting that variation in parenting
practices over time and across space lines up well with these predictions.
Next, we focus on technology, and in particular on the production function al-
3See Becker (1960) for the initial statement of the quantity-quality tradeoff and Doepke (2015)
for an overview of the role of this concept in the economics of fertility.
4For an overview of the economics of marriage and the family and some recent directions
in this literature see Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014), Lundberg and Pollak (2007), and
Lundberg, Pollak, and Stearns (2016). Surveys with a focus on the macroeconomic implications
of family decisions are provided by Doepke and Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood, Guner, and Van-
denbroucke (2017). For the economics of fertility see, for example, Hotz, Klerman, and Willis
(1997) and Chapter 7 of Doepke and Zilibotti (2019).
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lowing children to acquire and accumulate skills. Some of the issues discussed in
the underlying literature are the relative importance of parental and other inputs,
the effect of early versus late inputs as children develop, and the complementar-
ity between inputs over time and across different types of inputs.
Third, we focus on the effects of the environment. It has long been recognized
that peer effects count for a lot in child development, especially during adoles-
cence. This suggest that parents’ impact on their children may work in large part
through their influence on their children’s environment rather than through their
direct interactions with them. For example, parents choose the neighborhood in
which a family lives, and the schools which their children attend. We discuss how
these choices can be framed as an integral part of the economics of parenting.
We organize our discussion by presenting a general model that captures the main
aspects of the economics of parenting. We model the decision problem of parents
who care about their own utility and the welfare of their children. Following our
previous work in (Doepke and Zilibotti 2017), the concern for children allows for
both altruism (parents care about their children’s utility) and paternalism (par-
ents care about their children’s actions, in ways that potentially conflict with the
children’s own preferences). Parents face a set of constraints that include stan-
dard budget and time constraints, but also technological constraints. For exam-
ple, there is a “production function” that specifies how children’s skills and atti-
tudes evolve as a function of endowments and parental inputs. The framework
also allows for environmental influences outside the immediate family to affect
child development, such as peer effects in schools and neighborhood effects.
Using this general framework, we discuss the economic literature on the three
main issues outlined above, and we relate theoretical results to empirical evi-
dence. Much of the literature on the economics of parenting is recent; the re-
search frontier is constantly evolving, and many new questions raised by current
research are yet to be addressed. We therefore conclude by outlining a few areas
for future research on the economics of parenting that we consider particularly
promising.
In the following section, we present our economic model of parenting. In Sec-
tion 3, we use this model to discuss the economics of choosing a parenting style,
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and compare the predictions of the theory to data. In Section 4, we relate the
recent literature on children’s skill acquisition to our model of parenting. Neigh-
borhood and peer effects are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and directions
for future research are discussed in Section 6.
2 An Economic Model of Parenting
In this section, we outline a general economic model of parenting that we will use
to discuss parenting styles, skill formation, and neighborhood and peer effects
below. What we mean by “economic model” is that we conceive of parenting
decisions in the same way that economists conceive of any other decision: par-
ents pursue particular objectives that are summarized by a utility function, they
act rationally and purposefully in pursuing these objectives, and they are sub-
ject to various constraints such as limits to their financial resources, their knowl-
edge, their time, and the underlying technology of child development. Given
that much of parenting is about parent-child interactions, the model also allows
for children to have a say and take actions on their own. The main elements of
the model are a combination of our earlier work on parenting style (Doepke and
Zilibotti 2017) with the notion of a multistage production function for skill as in
James Heckman’s recent work with different coauthors (e.g., Cunha and Heck-
man 2007, Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010).
In the model, we limit attention to a single parent and a single child. We start
with the parent’s objectives. The parent derives utility during two periods of
adulthood, and also cares about the child. The value function that the parent
seeks to maximize is given by:
V = U1(C1, L1|A) + U2(C2, L2|A) + Z ((1− γ)v + γv˜) . (1)
We use the convention that upper-case variables refer to the parent, and lower-
case variables to the child. Accordingly, Ct and Lt are the parent’s consumption
and leisure in period t, and A is a vector of preference parameters for the parent.
The overall weight that the parent attaches to the welfare of the child is given by
the parameter Z > 0. The parent derives utility from the child in two different
ways. First, she cares about the child’s actual lifetime utility v, i.e., the parent
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displays altruism, as in Gary Becker’s work on dynastic utility (e.g., Becker and
Barro 1988, Barro and Becker 1989). Second, we also allow for the possibility that
the parent may evaluate the welfare of the child through a different function v˜
that does not coincide with the true utility of the child. This feature captures
paternalism, i.e., a utility derived form the child’s choices and outcomes that re-
flects the parents own, distinct views on what is good for the child. Paternalistic
preferences (and the related concept of imperfect empathy) play a central role in
the economic literature on cultural transmission.5 The parameter γ measures the
relative importance of altruism versus paternalism in the parent’s preferences.
We abstract from uncertainty during the two periods of adulthood, but the setup
allows for shocks that affect the child before reaching adulthood. The utility de-
rived from the child is therefore an expected utility.
The value function that the child seeks to maximize (and which enters in the
parent’s altruistic utility) is:
v = u1 (c1, l1|a1) + u2 (c2, l2|a2) + zV ′. (2)
Here ct and lt are consumption and leisure of the child, at is the child’s preference
vector at age t, and V ′ is the expected continuation utility of the child after reach-
ing adulthood, which in a dynastic model would be of the form (1). Unlike the
parent’s preferences A, the child’s preferences at evolve during childhood, which
captures the gradual formation of attitudes and non-cognitive skills such as pa-
tience and perseverance. Leisure lt can be a vector of different activities from
which the child derives enjoyment. The parameter z ∈ (0, 1) denotes the weight
that the child attached to future adult utility.
The parent’s paternalistic concern about the child v˜ is given by:
v˜ = u˜1 (c1, l1|A) + u˜2 (c2, l2|A) + zV ′,
that is, the parent’s paternalistic utility is defined over the same objects as the
child’s actual utility, but potentially with a different functional form for utility
5See Bisin and Verdier (2001) for a seminal contribution in this literature and Bisin and Verdier
(2010) for a survey.
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that may depend on the parent’s preferences A.
The key implication of the paternalistic component in preferences is that the par-
ent may disagree with the actions of the child; this scope for disagreement turns
out to play a central role in the economics of parenting. In particular, parenting
styles relate to how the disagreement between parent and child is resolved. Our
representation is rather general and can capture different sources of disagree-
ment, ranging from different views regarding risk aversion or work ethic to the
consumption of particular goods such as alcohol and cigarettes.
A particularly common source of disagreement between parents and children
(which we focus on below) stems from time preferences: the parent may wish
that the child focus more on long-run success rather than instant gratification.
More formally, the parent (in the paternalistic utility v˜) places relatively more
weight on the child’s future utility V ′ (compared to the young-age utility) than
does the child in her own utility function v. Notice that even though the same
discount factor z appears in v˜ and v, our setup still incorporates the possibility
of disagreement about intertemporal tradeoffs through the dependence of the
utility functions ut(·) and u˜t(·) on the preferences A and a of the parent and the
child. As a specific example, we can capture such a difference in patience by
setting the utility of the child to:
v = a1u(c1, l1) + a2βu(c2, l2) + β
2V ′, (3)
whereas the paternalistic preference of the parent is given by:
v˜ = u(c1, l1) + βu(c2, l2) + β
2V ′, (4)
where we define β ≡ √z. Here, β is the parent’s discount factor whereas the
child’s (scalar) preference parameters a1 ≥ 1 and a2 ≥ 1 capture additional
weight that the child places on experiences early in live relative to the later-in-life
expected utility V ′.6
6These utilities can be mapped into (1) and (2) by setting u1 (c1, l1|a1) = a1u (c1, l1),
u2 (c2, l2|a2) = a2βu (c2, l2), u˜1 (c1, l1|A) = u (c1, l1), and u˜2 (c1, l1|A) = βu (c2, l2). In Section 3.2
below, we focus on the case where a2 = a > 1 and a1 = a2. This case yields a constant intertem-
poral tradeoff, where the child’s discount factor β/a is smaller than the adult discount factor β. In
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Next, we turn to choices and constraints. The parent’s choices at time t include
own and the child’s consumption Ct and ct, leisure Lt, and labor supply Nt. We
are particularly interested in parenting choices, i.e., choices aimed at affecting the
development of the child. The parent’s investment in the child’s development is
represented by a vector It, where:
It = {Xt, Et} .
Here Xt is a time investment in child rearing, and Et is a monetary investment
(expense) in child rearing. The parent can also affect the influence of peers on
the child’s development by choosing the district of residence dt where the family
lives. Finally, the parent can determine the choice set Xt for the child, which
determines how much freedom of choice the child has.
The parent is constrained by an intertemporal budget constraint:
C1 + c1 + E1 + q(d1) +
1
R
(C2 + c2 + E2 + q(d2)) = w1 (S)N1 +
1
R
w2 (S)N2 (5)
and by a time constraint:
Lt +Nt +Xt = 1.
Here R is the gross interest rate, S is the skill vector of the parent, wt(S) is the
wage, and q (dt) is the rental cost of living in neighborhood dt. Neighborhoods
may differ for exogenous reasons, such as the quality of public schools. There
may be also peer externalities, namely, the quality of neighborhood is a function
of the average skills of the residents. If households cannot borrow, the intertem-
poral budget constraint is replaced by two sequential constraints.
The child’s choices are leisure lt and a vector of own investment in skills xt. The
choices of the child are constrained by the choice set imposed by the parent:
{lt, xt} ∈ Xt.
The choice set reflects time constraints as well as additional restrictions poten-
this case, we can write v = a2
(
u(c1, l1) + bu(c2, l2) + b
2V ′
)
and v˜ = u(c1, l1) + βu(c2, l2) + β2V ′,
where b = β/a < β.
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tially imposed by the parent. In turn, the parent’s choice of Xt has to respect
technological constraints, i.e., there is a set of feasible choice sets Xt and the par-
ent must satisfy Xt ∈ Xt. The feasible set Xt may in turn depend on the invest-
ments It, capturing that restricting or expanding the child’s choice may be costly
(e.g., time spent monitoring the child). For example, the parent may spend effort
to force the child to study more for school and to spend less time playing video
games, or the parent may force the child to adopt a particular occupation (e.g.,
accountant instead of circus performer). Conversely, the parent may expose the
child to role models or activities that broaden the range of actions among which
the child can choose.7
The final set of constraints for both parent and child concern the technology of
skill accumulation. The child’s skills consist of cognitive skills ht and noncog-
nitive skills (e.g., preferences, attitudes, and values) at. Let st = {ht, at} denote
the entire skill vector of the child. S denotes the skill vector of the parent. Let
s1 denote the initial skill vector of the child. In the first period of childhood, the
child’s skills evolve as a function of initial conditions, the parent’s investment,
the environment, and the child’s effort x1:
s2 = f1(S, s1, I1, d1, x1), (6)
In the second period (adolescence), we have:
S ′ = f2(S, s2, I2, d2, x2), (7)
where S ′ = {H ′, A′} is the child’s skill vector at the beginning of adulthood,
which in turn determines the child’s utility as an adult V ′.
We have now all the pieces in place to discuss the three specific elements of the
economics of parenting outlined in the introduction. In the following section, we
focus on parenting style, which is about how the disagreement between parent
and child is resolved. In Section 4 we deal with the technology of skill formation,
7The parent’s control over the children’s choice set relates our model to Bandura’s (1986) social
cognitive theory. According to this theory, children learn from role models to which they are ex-
posed. Saez Marti (2018) incorporates this notion in an economic model of cultural transmission
through endogenous parental influence.
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which is about the specific properties of the technology (6)–(7), and how these
properties interact with other aspects of parenting. The role of the choice of a
neighborhood dt in parenting is analyzed in Section 6.
3 The Economics of Parenting Style
The framework outlined in the previous section can shed light on a variety of
aspects of parent-child interactions. In developmental psychology, starting with
the seminal work of Baumrind (1967) the concept of parenting style takes a cen-
tral place in categorizing types of parenting. For us, the choice of parenting style
describes the extent to which parents interfere with their children’s own inclina-
tions, and how they go about getting children to conform to their own wishes.
3.1 Parenting Styles in the General Model
In the general framework above, consider the child’s choices xt in period t = 1, 2,
which may include actions such as effort put into studying for school, but also
other choices with potential long-run consequences such as drinking alcohol, un-
protected sex, and similar risky behaviors. In the analysis of Doepke and Zilibotti
(2017), parenting styles come down to whether, and how, parents interfere with
the child’s choice. If the child can choose xt freely, she will do this with the objec-
tive of maximizing her own utility (2). How will the parent feel about this choice?
If the parent is purely altruistic (i.e., if γ = 0, so that only the altruistic compo-
nent enters (1)), the parent will necessarily agree. Such a parent simply wants the
child to be happy, and hence approves of anything that contributes to the child’s
happiness. However, if the parent is at least somewhat paternalistic (γ > 0), there
may be disagreement. For example, if the parent places relatively more weight
on the child’s future relative to the enjoyment of the present, the parent will wish
that the child puts more effort into education than what the child would choose
of her own accord. Similarly, if the parent’s paternalistic preferences incorpo-
rate more risk aversion than the child’s own utility, the parent may wish that the
child stayed away from certain risk-taking activities that the child would like to
engage in.
The three traditional parenting styles in developmental psychology can be un-
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derstood as archetypes of resolutions of this conflict between parent and child.8
The permissive parenting style is the scenario where the parent lets the child have
her way and refrains from interfering in the choices xt. The authoritarian style is
one where the parent imposes her will through coercion. In the model above, co-
ercion (i.e., authoritarian parenting) is captured through the notion of restricting
the choice set Xt. An authoritarian parent chooses a small set Xt that leaves little
or no leeway to the child. The third parenting style, authoritative parenting, is
also one where the parent aims to affect the child’s choice. However, rather than
using coercion, an authoritative parent uses persuasion: she shapes the child’s
preferences a2 through investments I1 in the first period of life. For example,
such a parent may preach the virtues of patience or the dangers of risk during
when the child is little, so that the child ends up with more adult-like preferences
when the child’s own decisions matter during adolescence.
What determines the tradeoff between these parenting styles? All parenting
styles come with costs and benefits. Permissive parenting maximizes the utility
of the child, but the child may end up making choices that go against the pater-
nalistic drive of the parent. An authoritarian parent directly influences the child’s
choice, but this lowers the happiness of the child and may have other repercus-
sions, in particular if there are economic benefits (in terms of the child’s future
expected utility) to making independent decisions. An authoritative parent also
influences the child’s choice, but this parenting style requires costly effort on part
of the parent and may also reduce the child’s welfare. How these tradeoffs are
resolved depends in part on the level of paternalism γ. More importantly, for a
given level of paternalism what matters are the economic conditions that shape
the impact that a given decision will have on the child’s future.
3.2 The Impact of Economic Conditions on Parenting Style
We illustrate the interaction between economic conditions and parenting styles
with a specialized version of the model in Section 2 where the dimension of child
8Sometimes neglecting parenting is considered as a fourth parenting style. We abstract from
this parenting style here; see Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) for a discussion.
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preferences that parents aim to influence is patience.9 Patience is a natural start-
ing point for a theory of parent-child transmission of preferences, both because
disagreements about how to weigh immediate gratification versus future payoffs
is a particularly salient aspect of parent-child interactions, and because patience
matters for future-oriented investments such as education.10 The stylized model
is based on our work in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) and Agostinelli et al. (2019).
The model is stripped down to the essential elements needed to bring out the
main tradeoffs involved in choosing a parenting style. We abstract from goods
consumption and labor supply. For the parent, the period utility function is lin-
ear in leisure, given by L1 = 1 − X1, where X1 is parenting effort. There is no
parenting effort in the second period, so that (ignoring constants) utility (1) takes
the form:
−X1 + Z ((1− γ)v + γv˜) .
For the child, we abstract from utility during the first (early childhood) period.
During the second (adolescence) period, the child gets linear utility from leisure
l2, which depends on the child’s vector x2 of education investments. There is
disagreement about the intertemporal tradeoff between the child and the pater-
nalistic parent as in (3) and (4). Given that utility is only derived in the second
period, we can rewrite (3) and (4) as:
v =a2l2 + βV
′, (8)
v˜ =l2 + βV
′, (9)
where a2 ≥ 1 is the extent to which the child places more weight on fun in the
present versus welfare in the future.
Next, we turn to the technology of skill formation. In the first period, the tech-
9Models of endogenous patience were first applied by Becker and Mulligan (1997), Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005), and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
10See Figlio et al. (2016), Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), and Sutter et al. (2013) for evi-
dence at the micro level, and Dohmen et al. (2018) for a country-level analysis of the relationship
between patience and development. Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) also consider the transmission
of risk preferences, which have been shown by Dohmen et al. (2012) to be strongly correlated
between parents and children. Zumbuehl, Dohmen, and Pfann (2013) find that risk attitudes are
particularly close for parents who invest a lot in child-rearing effort, which is consistent with the
general model of parenting described here.
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nology (6) for the accumulation of the skill vector s2 = {h2, a2} takes the form:
h2 =fh,1 (S, d1) ,
a2 =fa,1 (S,X1, d1) .
That is, the child’s cognitive skills in adolescence h2 evolve passively depending
on endowments (represented by the parent’s skill vector S) and the environment
(represented by the neighborhood quality d1, taken as fixed here). We abstract
from investment in cognitive skills by both the parent and the child at this stage.
Instead, parental involvement is crucial for the acquisition of noncognitive skills,
here represented by the child’s preference parameter a2. In addition to S and
d1, this parameter depends on the parent’s time investment X1. Intuitively, in-
creasing the child’s patience (here, by lowering the enjoyment of the present a2)
requires a “socialization” effort that is costly in terms of time. In the first period,
the parent also chooses the choice set X2 that constrains the child’s choice in the
second period.
In the second period (adolescence), adult skills are formed. At this stage, par-
ents make no further direct investment and the ball is in the child’s court. The
child is now called on to make decisions x2 in two dimensions: the choice of an
occupation k and an investment in human capital xh,2, i.e., x2 = {k, xh,2}. The
acquisition of adult skills S ′ = H ′ hinges on xh,2 and the values and skills the
child has acquired in the early period:
H ′ = fh,2 (S, h2, d2, xh,2) .
Here, H ′ is strictly increasing in the educational effort xh,2.
The occupations k differ in the relative importance of talent and effort. Specifi-
cally, each occupation k is defined by a triplet {x¯k, w¯k, ψk} determining the time
x¯k required to learn the basics of the occupation, the basic wage w¯k in the occupa-
tion, and the return ψk to human capital H ′. The potential income a child would
realize in occupation k is given by:
ξk [w¯k + (ψkH
′wH + (1− ψkH ′)wL)] ,
12
where, ξk is an i.i.d. individual talent shock capturing a Roy-model type compar-
ative advantage at different occupations with unit mean and finite variance, and
wL > 0 and wH > wL capture the overall return to education. The talent shock
is realized in the second (adolescence) period, before the child decides on x2 (so
that the child does not face uncertainty), but after the parent’s choice of X1 and
X2 in the first period.
The setup captures that in some occupations, success hinges primarily on the
child’s talent and intrinsic motivation (e.g., becoming an artist or an elite sport
player), and hence on her choosing something she is good at. Such occupations
are characterized by a high variance of the talent shock ξk across individuals, but
a low return ψk to formal education. In other occupations, such as becoming an
engineer or a business manager, cognitive human capital, and hence success in
education, is more important. In such occupations, the talent shock ξk has little
variance or may even be constant and the basic wage w¯k is low, but the return to
educational effort ψk is high. Professions also differ in how difficult it is to learn
the basics; children may find it more pleasant to train to become an actor (low
x¯k) than to study math or economics (high x¯k). Overall inequality is captured by
wL > 0 and wH ≥ wL: when the gap between wH and wL is small, both inequality
and the return to education are low.
The child chooses the vector x2 (i.e., the occupation k and educational effort xh,2)
so as to maximize her own utility (8):
max
x2∈X2
a2 (1− (xh,2 + x¯k)) + zV ′,
where
V ′ = ξk [w¯k + (ψkH ′wH + (1− ψkH ′)wL)]
and, recall:
H ′ = fh,2 (S, h2, d2, xh,2) .
Now consider how economic conditions affect the choice of parenting style. The
basic parent-child conflict underlying this choice is that the parent attaches a
higher weight to the future utility V ′ of the child. As a result, the parent would
like the child to exert a greater educational effort xh,2 than the child would do
13
on her own accord. While in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) we allow for intensive
margins in parenting (e.g., parents can be more or less authoritative, and more
or less authoritarian), here we simplify the analysis by restricting parents to a
discrete choice between the three parenting styles: permissive (PE), authoritative
(AV), and authoritarian (AR). Each parenting style P ∈ {PE,AV,AR} comes with
a specific effort cost XP for the parent.
The permissive parent PE does not interfere with the child’s preferences, so that
a2 > 1 and the child gets full enjoyment of adolescence, and also does not restrict
the choice of occupation. In principle, a permissive parent might even spend
effort to expand the children’s choice set, for example by offering more opportu-
nities for entertainment. However, we abstract from this possibility here and set
the effort cost of permissive parenting to zero, XPE = 0.
The authoritative parent AV does not restrict the child’s choice set, but molds
her preferences. Specifically, this parent socializes the child into adult-like pref-
erences, a2 = 1. This “indoctrination” reduces in the child’s enjoyment of adoles-
cence while inducing her to make more forward-looking choices x2, to the extent
that the child ends up choosing just what her parent would like her to. Indoctri-
nating the child requires effort XAV (S, d1) > 0, which is decreasing in both the
skill of the parent and the quality of the neighborhood. This assumption reflects
that better-educated parents possess superior soft skills to persuade their chil-
dren (e.g., they use more convincing arguments to convince them that working
for school is a good idea). In addition, the parental effort can be reinforced by
a positive neighborhood culture, including good teachers and peers who share
work-oriented values.
Finally, the authoritarian parent AR forces the child into a particular occupation
(i.e., the choice set X given to the child only includes the occupation k preferred
by the parent). Authoritarian parents also impose control on the child’s effort
choice xh,2. Imposing these restrictions requires costly monitoring and on the
part of the parent, which is captured by a positive effort cost XAR > 0. Depend-
ing on the parent’s skill and the neighborhood, XAR may be larger or smaller
than the cost of the authoritative style XAV (S, d1). Unlike authoritative parents,
authoritarian parents do not change their children’s preferences. For them, the
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Parenting Style Indoctrinate Child Restrict Child’s Choice Cost to Parent
Permissive No (a2 > 1) No 0
Authoritarian No (a2 > 1) Yes XAR > 0
Authoritative Yes (a2 = 1) No XAV (S, d1) > 0
Table 1: Three Parenting Styles in the Model
problem is not what children think but what they do. Therefore, they force them
to do as parents like rather than attempt to persuade them of the validity of the
adult standpoint. A downside of the authoritarian style is that the parent locks
the child into a particular occupation before the child’s occupation-specific talent
shock is realized.
As an example of this kind of authoritarian parenting, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017)
discuss a setting in which parents force their children to stay at home and work
in the family business instead of allowing them to move to the city and study.
Doepke and Zilibotti (2019) discuss other forms of control over the process of
skill formation. For instance, a young child wishing to become a professional
soccer player may be denied the opportunity to practice that sport at an early
age. Conversely, a child may be forced to play piano or tennis for many hours so
as to induce specialization to an extent that it delimits the choice set of the child
when this grows up.
Table 1 summarizes the features of the three parenting styles. We can now assess
how economic conditions affect the choice between them. Consider, first, a low-
inequality society, where the gap between wH and wL is small. In such a society,
there is limited incentive for children to put effort xh,2 into education. Parents
are also less concerned about children’s effort, and thus there is little scope for
disagreement between parents and children. Therefore, most parents adopt a
permissive parenting style, namely, they keep young children happy and foster
their sense of independence so that they can discover what they are good at in
their adult life. There may still be a small fraction of highly paternalistic par-
ents (high γ) who want to influence their children’s occupational choice. Among
them, those with low skills S will be authoritarian, i.e., resort to restrictions on
15
the choice set. The downside of this parenting strategy is that it prevents children
from learning professions in which they have a strong comparative advantage,
ex post. For instant, talented painters may become not-so-well-paid engineers.
Highly paternalistic parents with high skills S will instead be authoritative.
Consider, next, a high-inequality society. There, the disagreement between par-
ents and children is more salient, because parents would like to see their children
work hard in school and choose professions with a high return to human capital.
In this society, a larger share of parents will be authoritative, and fewer will be
permissive. Moreover, because of the comparative advantage of rich and edu-
cated parents in authoritative parenting, there will be a stronger socioeconomic
sorting into parenting styles. Since an authoritative parenting style is conducive
to more economic success, this sorting will hamper social mobility.
While inequality drives the choice margin between permissive and authoritative
parenting style, other factors determine the appeal of authoritarian parenting. In
Doepke and Zilibotti (2017), we discuss the role of the return to incumbency. In
traditional societies, most children adopt their parents’ profession and learn the
necessary skills inside the family. Thus, parents have little incentive to be per-
missive in order to let children discover what they are good at. Nor do they need
to spend effort in socializing children into adult-like values (i.e., to be authorita-
tive) since they can achieve the same result by simply monitoring them. As the
economy develops, occupational mobility grows, the return to incumbency falls,
and the appeal of authoritative parenting declines.
In our model, we can parameterize the value of independence by the variance
of the talent shock ξk. When this variance is low, the opportunity cost of au-
thoritarian parenting is small. As the variance of ξk increases, so does the value
of letting children discover their talent. Hence, fewer and fewer parents will be
authoritarian and restrict their children’s occupational choice.
3.3 Empirical Evidence on Economic Conditions and Parenting Styles
The discussion in the previous section generates a number of testable predictions.
In Doepke and Zilibotti (2019), we show that in many industrialized countries,
the trend of rising income inequality over recent decades has been accompanied
16
by more “intensive” (authoritarian or authoritative) parenting, while permissive
parenting has declined. Evidence from the Multinational Time Use Study shows
that in all countries for which a sufficient number of observations is available
(Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain), time diaries display a significant in-
crease in the time parents spend with their children. For the United States and the
Netherlands we have long time series, which makes these two cases especially
informative. In both countries, college-educated parents have increased the time
spent on child care much more than high-school graduates. In the 1970s, low-
and high-educated parents the United States spent about the same time on child
care. Today, there is a gap of more than three hours per week between more and
less educated parents. Ramey and Ramey (2010), who were the first to note this
diverging behavior, suggest that this trend is explained by increased competition
for admission to top colleges.
A large share of increase in child care time is related to educational activities.
Back in 1976, American couples spent an average of two hours a week on play-
ing, reading, and talking to their children, and about 17 minutes a week on help-
ing them with homework. In 2012, the average went up to six and a half hours
a week for playing, reading, and talking to children, and more than 1.5 hours for
helping them with homework. Overall, American parents now spend 3.5 times
more time on these education-related child care activities. This shift to more in-
tensive and less permissive parenting styles is reflected in children’s experiences.
The percentage of kids walking or biking alone to school fell from 41% in 1969
to 13% in 2001. Among 6-to-8-year-old Americans, unsupervised playtime de-
creased by 25% between 1981 and 1997, whereas time spent on homework more
than doubled. This is consistent with parents pushing children towards academic
achievement.
This rise in child care time is associated with the widely discussed phenomenon
of helicopter parenting, i.e., the trend (especially pronounced among the upper
and middle classes) towards an increasingly intrusive and protecting parenting
style, with a mix of authoritarian and authoritative elements. In what follows,
we relate these trends to changing macroeconomic conditions in areas such as
income inequality, the return to education, and redistributive policies, following
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the investigation in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2019).
First, we document that parents are less permissive (and, especially, more au-
thoritative) in countries with higher inequality across OECD countries.11 We use
information from the World Value Survey (WVS), where people are asked to se-
lect five values (out of a list of ten) that children should be encouraged to learn
at home.12 To simplify the discussion of the evidence, we use a binary classifi-
cation of parenting styles. We classify as intensive parents who single out either
obedience (a value typically associated with an authoritarian parenting style) or
hard work (which is associated with an authoritative parenting style). We classify
as relaxed those who mention either independence or imagination, and neither
obedience nor hard work. Intensive parenting corresponds to a combination of
authoritarian and authoritative methods, and relaxed parenting to permissive
methods.13 This classification covers 91% of a sample of 66,632 respondents from
OECD countries. Among them, 63% are classified as intensive, and 37% are clas-
sified as relaxed. We exclude from the analysis the 9% of respondents who re-
main unclassified because they do not mention any of the four above-mentioned
values.
We study the correlation between intensive parenting and measures of pre-tax
earnings inequality and government-mandated redistribution. In particular, we
use: (i) the 90th-to-10th percentile ratio in the pre-tax earnings of full-time depen-
dent employees; (ii) the return to tertiary education (Montenegro and Patrinos
2014); (iii) a measure of tax progressivity that captures the marginal rate pro-
gression up to an income level equivalent to four times a country’s per capita
11The sample includes all countries with available data that were OECD members as of 1994:
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. The cross-country
pattern is robust if we include the nine countries with available data that became OECD members
after 1994 (Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Slovenia).
12The question is worded as follows: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged
to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up
to five!”The values among which parents can choose are independence, hard work, feeling of
responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for others, thrift and saving money, determina-
tion and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, and obedience.
13In Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) we show that the results are robust to other classifications,
such as defining as authoritative all non-authoritarian parents who mention either hard work or
determination and perseverance among top five values.
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Figure 1: Inequality, Redistribution, and Intensive Parenting across Countries
GDP (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 2010); (iv) a measure of aggregate
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database.14
Figure 1 plots the results for Wave 5 of the World Value Survey, which was carried
out in 2005 and which has the largest number of countries. As predicted by the
theory, the share of intensive parents increases with pre-tax inequality and the re-
turn to education (upper panels) and decreases with the extent of redistribution
through tax progressivity and social expenditure. For instance, 79% of Ameri-
can respondents are classified as intensive—and the US has both high earnings
inequality and a high return to education, and low tax progressivity and social
expenditure. Among the US respondents, 49% are authoritative and 30% are au-
thoritarian in the classification of Doepke and Zilibotti (2017). In contrast, only
26% of the Swedes are intensive parents, whereas 74% are relaxed—and Sweden
14Note that (iii) and (iv) are inverse measures of inequality.
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has low inequality and high redistribution. Countries with moderate inequality
such as Germany and Japan fall in between. The overall pattern conforms well
with the prediction of the theory for all measures of inequality.
The cross-country results still leave open the possibility that parenting styles are
mostly due to some unchanging local tradition, and that the correlation with
inequality is due to omitted variables. It is therefore important to verify the
results using changes in inequality and parenting styles within countries over
time. Here, we focus on changes in pretax earnings inequality, for which we in-
formation at a higher frequency. We expect that intensive parenting increases in
countries where inequality increases and decreases in countries that become less
unequal.
To examine this prediction, we perform regression analysis based on individual
data. We estimate the following equation:
INT_PARict = αc + αt + β · INEQct +X ′ict · γ + εict,
where i, c, and t stand for individual, country, and time (wave). The dependent
variable INT_PAR is an indicator for parenting style, where INT_PAR = 1 means
that the parent is intensive, whereas INT_PAR = 0 means that the parent is re-
laxed. Among the right hand-side variables, αc is a country fixed effect, αt is
a wave fixed effect, INEQct is a time-varying measure of inequality (the 90-10
earnings ratio), X is a vector of individual and country characteristics including
gender, age, age squared, and the (log of) GDP, and ε is an error term.
We estimate a logistic regression on 45,482 individual observations. Table 2 dis-
plays the estimates for β, expressed as odds ratios. All regressions include wave
fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the country level. Column (1) dis-
plays the basic specification. Column (2) adds the control variables Xict. Column
(3) also adds country fixed effects. The odds ratio is significantly larger than unity
and stable across specifications. In all cases, higher inequality increases the prob-
ability of intensive parenting. In columns (4), (5), and (6), we repeat the analysis
while also including the measures of tax progressivity and social expenditure.
The results in columns (4) and (5) confirm that each of the three variables of in-
terest has the predicted effect: inequality increases the intensive parenting style,
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Table 2: Inequality, Redistribution, and Parenting Styles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive
Inequality 2.38*** 2.50*** 2.12** 1.74*** 1.74*** 27.22**
(0.44) (0.29) (0.72) (0.37) (0.28) (35.21)
Tax progressivity 0.20** 0.24** 5.35
(0.13) (0.17) (5.88)
Social expenditure 0.70 0.58 0.21**
(0.29) (0.25) (0.14)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 45,482 45,482 45,482 32,196 32,196 32,196
Dependent variable: intensive parenting style (indicator). All the models are logistic models and
the displayed coefficients are odds ratios. All the models include wave fixed effects. Models
in Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) include controls for gender, age, age squared, and log of GDP
per capita (based on expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs, from Penn World Table 9.0).
Models in Columns (3) and (6) also include country fixed effects. Inequality is defined as the
ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile of gross earnings of full-time dependent employees.
Tax progressivity is from Andrew Young School of Policy Studies (2010). Safety nets are expressed
as the aggregate social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
while tax progressivity and social expenditure reduce it (though the effect of the
latter is not statistically significant). In the panel regression (6), the three effects
are less well identified. The effects of inequality and social expenditure conform
with the prediction of the theory, but the odds ratios are very high and low, re-
spectively. Tax progressivity is not statistically significant. The mixed results in
regression (6) reflect the limited time variation for the measures of redistribution,
which makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates in fixed-effect regressions.15
15All results hold true irrespective of whether we include all respondents or only those who
are actually parents. They are also robust to the inclusion of a a self-reported dummy for religios-
ity. Finally, they are robust to an alternative definition of parenting style, where we classify as
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The correlations are quantitatively large. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical
parent born in a country where the 90-to-10 measure of inequality is three, close
to the average for European countries. Suppose the individual characteristics
of this parent and the country fixed effect are such that her probability of being
intensive is 40% (approximately the average value for countries like Germany,
Japan, and Switzerland). Now consider an increase of inequality from three to
five, close to the US value, holding other characteristics—including the country
fixed effect—constant. Then, the probability for this parent to be intensive in-
creases from 40% to 75%. Although this estimated change cannot be interpreted
as causal, this is a large effect, moving the likelihood of being an intensive parent
close to the proportion of intensive parents in the United States.
So far, we have focused on the relaxed versus intensive margin (or, equivalently,
permissive versus nonpermissive), showing that high inequality turns parents
less relaxed. Consider, next, the margin of authoritarian versus nonauthoritar-
ian parenting (i.e., parents who emphasize obedience versus those who don’t).
In this case, the key variables are (i) whether the effort of children can be eas-
ily monitored; (ii) the extent of occupational mobility (which affects the return
to independence and hence the choice between authoritarian and authoritative
parenting). Two (highly correlated) proxies for macroeconomic conditions that
affect this margin are the share of agriculture and the enrollment rate in tertiary
education. In traditional agricultural societies, most children live and work un-
der the parents’ direct supervision. Moreover, most of them are expected also to
become farmers and to learn the skills from their parents. In such societies the
return to independence is low. Conversely, in societies where many children re-
ceive higher education, they are expected to work hard on their own initiative, as
students often live far from their families and must take important independent
decisions, such as which subject to major in and how hard to study. Therefore,
we should expect parents to be more authoritarian in traditional agricultural so-
cieties where the share of enrollment in higher education is low. Figure 2 shows
that these predictions are borne out in the data: across countries, the share of
authoritarian parents is increasing in the employment share of agriculture and
intensive parents who mention either hard work or determination and perseverance among the
preferred parenting values.
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Figure 2: Share of Agriculture, Higher Education, and Authoritarian Parenting
decreasing in the enrollment rate in tertiary education.
Doepke and Zilibotti (2019) also examine the effect of religiosity on parenting.
They show that religious people are significantly less permissive and more au-
thoritarian than nonreligious people. This finding is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that many traditionally religious parents believe that the world is regulated
by a never-changing order, and that it is their duty to transmit to their children
an immutable set of values and truths.16 The result is based on US data from the
Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). In the initial survey of the PSID-CDS in 1997, parents are asked whether
they have ever spanked their children. In addition, they are asked whether re-
ligion is very important in their life. The data set also contains information on
parenting styles. Religious parents have a more positive attitude towards corpo-
ral punishment: 70% of religious parents report spanking their children, against
58% of non-religious parents. These results are robust to controlling for a variety
of socio-economic characteristics such as income or education that may be related
16According to Bartkowski and Ellison (1995), such parents do not emphasize creativity and in-
tellectual curiosity, but instead believe that “. . . to succeed in adult roles, children must be trained
to embrace the divinely-ordained principles of authority and hierarchy” (p.25). Therefore, reli-
gious parents may be more prone to be authoritarian.
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to both religiosity and the use of corporal punishment. In addition, non-religious
parents are significantly more permissive than religious ones, especially Protes-
tants. The effect is quantitatively large. Consider a nonreligious parent whose
probabilities to be permissive, authoritative and authoritarian are, respectively,
50%, 25%, and 25%. The probability for an otherwise identical parent who is
an observant Protestant to embrace each of the three parenting styles are, re-
spectively, 30%, 25%, and 45%. Similar patterns are observed in a cross-country
analysis based on the WVS.
Overall, the evidence lines up very well with the predictions of our simple model
of the economics of parenting. Empirically, economic factors can account for a
substantial fraction of the variation in parenting practices over time and across
space. Clearly, the results do not rule out that non-economic factors also matter,
such as the role of religiosity discussed above. The evidence is also at the level of
correlations, and more work towards causal identification is needed to confirm
the results. Nevertheless, the results are indicative that the economic approach
can be quite successful in explaining what parents do.
3.4 Additional Mechanisms for the Choice of a Parenting Style
The economic literature on parenting has identified additional mechanisms rel-
evant for the choice of a parenting style that are not captured by the model out-
lined in Section 3.2. Among the earliest contributions is Weinberg (2001), who
focuses on the role of monetary incentives in raising children. In his model,
richer parents can use monetary rewards to get their children to comply with
their wishes. Poor parents lack the resources to do the same, and hence may
be more likely to resort to authoritarian methods such as corporal punishment.
Hence, the mechanism can contribute to our understanding of the distribution of
parenting styles in the population and also help explain the impact of parental
income on child achievement.
Another interesting dimension is information frictions. At least initially, children
know a lot less than parents do, and part of the challenge of parenting is to con-
vince children of what the parents know is right. Information transmission from
parent to child may be distorted for a number of reasons; for example, the child
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may mistrust the parent and believe that she is being fed wrong information for
strategic reasons (“if you don’t eat your vegetables, you will never grow big!”),
or it may simply be difficult to convey complex, tacit, or informal knowledge. In
the model of Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008), the authors focus on the polar case
where the parent is unable to directly convey information, and the child learns
entirely from experience. The parent faces a tradeoff between letting the child
learn from her own mistakes or correcting the child, but at the cost of inhibiting
learning. As in the model above, how much is at stake in these decisions matters
for the optimal parenting strategy. In a recent paper, Seror (2019) combines the
principal-agent approach followed by Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008) with some
of the tradeoffs incorporated in the model described in Section 3.2 above.
Other recent studies involving a choice of parenting strategies include Burton,
Phipps, and Curtis (2002), who focus on how a parent responds to “bad behav-
ior” by a child; Cobb-Clark, Salamanca, and Zhu (2019), who introduce a dis-
tinction between parents’ time and attention as inputs in child rearing; Cosconati
(2013), who considers the contrast between a strict and a permissive parenting
style in a setting where parent and child disagree on the relative importance of
the child’s leisure; Zhang and Ikeda (2016), where a central role is played by a
process of habit formation that only the parent is fully aware of; Hao, Hotz, and
Jin (2008), who focus on strategic interplay between strict and lenient parenting
in families with multiple children; and Lundberg, Romich, and Tsang (2009) and
Romich, Lundberg, and Tsang (2009), who analyze the non-cooperative interac-
tion between paternalistic parents and myopic children. Cunha (2015) considers
the role of information frictions on the part of parents, who may differ in their
subjective assessment of the productivity of different parenting styles. The self-
interest of parents takes center stage in Becker, Murphy, and Spenkuch (2016),
where parents may attempt to manipulate their children’s preferences in order
to receive more support in old age. None of these studies attempt to account for
variation in parenting styles across countries and over time. Instead, they intro-
duce a broad range of mechanisms and forces that are potentially relevant in the
choice of a parenting style, and that could be included in more encompassing
future models of parenting behavior.
25
4 The Economics of Children’s Skill Acquisition
Skills and abilities are important determinants of an individual’s life and eco-
nomic success. In economics, the process of skill acquisition first took center
stage in the early literature on human capital that was pioneered by Gary Becker
and Jacob Mincer, among others. Initially, the analysis of human capital accumu-
lation was focused on cognitive skills that traditionally have been deemed rel-
evant for shaping outcomes such as education and earnings (Murnane, Willett,
and Levy 1995; Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2001). More recent literature has
also shown how noncognitive skills such as perseverance, patience, sociability,
and other personality and behavioral traits are important determinants of out-
comes in childhood and adulthood (Heckman and Rubinstein 2001; Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013).
Different disciplines such as economics, psychology, and sociology share the
view that childhood is a critical period in an individual’s life because this is when
many of the attributes that will affect adult outcomes are acquired. In economics,
the consideration of family influences during childhood was popularized by the
work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), who analyze the role of endowments
versus investment in the determination of intergenerational mobility. Since then,
a large literature has aimed to understand the process through which children
acquire skills in detail.
In our parenting model in Section 2, the technology of skill acquisition is repre-
sented by equations (6) and (7), reproduced here for easy reference:
s2 = f1(S, s1, I1, d1, x1), (10)
S ′ = f2(S, s2, I2, d2, x2), (11)
where the skill vectors during childhood st and adulthood (S for the parent, S ′
for the child) include both cognitive and noncognitive skills. This formulation of
skill acquisition already incorporates some central insights of the recent literature
on skill acquisition. For example, the technology gives a role to both endowments
(represented by the parent’s skills S and the child’s initial skills s1) and later in-
vestments in skills. Also, the technology allows for investment on part of both
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parent (It) and child (xt), and the environment (such as schools, neighborhoods,
and peers) also matters (dt). An important feature of this formulation is that it
allows for the cumulative formation of skills. The skills h2 acquired during child-
hood are one of the inputs in skill acquisition during adolescence. The model
allows for different degrees of complementarity or substitutability of early and
late investments in skills.
A focal point of the literature on skill formation is to pin down the technology
(10) and (11) in more detail, beyond the general functional form. Some of the
central questions in this literature are:
• What is the relative importance of endowments, parental investment, own
investment, and the environment for the acquisition of cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills?
• During which phase of childhood are investments in cognitive and noncog-
nitive skills the most effective?
• Are early and late investments in skills complements or substitutes?
All of these issues are relevant for parents who want to decide which parent-
ing style to adopt and how to best invest in the skills of their children. What is
more, these questions are also crucial for the design of public policy. The tim-
ing of skill acquisition helps determine at what ages public investment in school
and child care are likely to be most effective. The issue of substitutability ver-
sus complementarity matters for whether early deficits (say, regarding children
from socially disadvantaged backgrounds) can be offset by interventions later on
(say, training and tutoring during high school) or should be addressed as early as
possible. The substitution relationship between parental and other inputs (such
as public schooling) determines whether public programs that aim to foster skill
acquisition can concentrate on providing public inputs, or whether support and
tutoring for parents should be a central plank of such programs.
A large body of research during the last two decades provides answers to many
of these questions. Recent comprehensive overviews of this literature are pro-
vided by Heckman and Mosso (2014) and Attanasio (2015). Here, we focus on
the main insights of this literature and some of the most recent developments.
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The work by James Heckman and his coauthors represents a central part of our
understanding of the process of skill formation. Building on the framework of
Becker and Tomes, this research describes the complex process of skill forma-
tion through the formalization of a multistage technology of skill formation. The
combination of a theory for the technology of skill formation (Cunha and Heck-
man 2007) with estimates of the skill production function (Cunha and Heckman
2008; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010) makes it possible to characterize
the process of human development and to rationalize the available empirical ev-
idence. First, as reflected in the technology (10) and (11), skills are multidimen-
sional (Almlund et al. 2011). Cognition and IQ are not the only determinants
of success in life; personality traits such as perseverance, conscientiousness, and
sociability are equally important in shaping future outcomes. Second, skills are
malleable and genetics is only one of the main possible determinants of the set of
individual skills and abilities.
Perhaps the most important finding in the recent literature is that early childhood
(up to about four years of age) is a crucial phase for skill acquisition. Carneiro
and Heckman (2003), Ermisch and Francesconi (2005), and Heckman and Mosso
(2014) document that cognitive and noncognitive outcomes are largely shaped
early in life.17 The skill gaps that can be found between individuals from differ-
ent socio-economic backgrounds opens at very early stages of childhood. More-
over, early interventions have higher returns and are more effective in reducing
achievement gaps than later interventions. Later investments are especially in-
effective if not anticipated by at least some earlier investments (see Cunha et al.
2006 and Knudsen et al. 2006).
Our theoretical representation of the technology of skill formation (10) and (11)
is closely related to Cunha and Heckman (2007). A key feature here is that child-
hood consists of multiple periods.18 The model allows for two important fea-
tures. The first feature is self-productivity of human capital. Skills acquired in a
17Works such as Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Heckman and Masterov (2007), and Cunha
et al. (2006) show the important role of parents—through ability and engagement—in producing
both cognitive and noncognitive skills.
18The recognition of different stages of child development was widely acknowledged in the
child development literature (Erikson 1950), but initially neglected by the economics of child
development.
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certain period persist and contribute to the creation of new skills in the following
periods. The second feature is dynamic complementarity, namely the observation
that skills produced at a specific stage of life raise the productivity of investments
at later stages. This implies that investments made at different ages foster each
other. Moreover, complementarity suggests that early-in-life investments should
be followed by later investments in order to increase their productivity.
Empirical evidence on these features is provided by Cunha and Heckman (2008)
and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010). Cunha and Heckman (2008) esti-
mate a linear dynamic factor model to identify the multistage investment tech-
nology under the assumption that early and late investments as perfect substi-
tutes. In Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), a more general nonlinear tech-
nology is identified. Estimates are obtained through a dynamic factor model
where both cognitive and noncognitive skills are modeled as low-dimensional la-
tent variables. Estimates of these models show clear evidence of self-productivity
and complementarity. Self-productivity becomes more evident as as the child
gets older. For cognitive skills, the complementarity between investments and
skills tends to increase over the life cycle. As a result, compensating measures
to offset adverse environments are less effective at later ages. Complementarity
between noncognitive skills and investments display a different pattern: the esti-
mated effects are similar at different stages of child development, making it easier
to intervene with later remediation. Investments are particularly productive for
disadvantaged children. The recognition of disadvantaged children as the opti-
mal target for interventions also stands out in the recent study Agostinelli and
Wiswall (2016).19
Another focus of the literature is the importance of household and family charac-
teristics in shaping child development. Many papers such as Duncan et al. (1998),
Akee et al. (2010), Bernal and Keane (2011), Dahl and Lochner (2012), Løken,
Mogstad, and Wiswall (2012), and Agostinelli and Sorrenti (2018) study the im-
pact of a family’s financial constraints on child development. Del Boca, Flinn,
19Other important contributions to the estimation of the technology of skill formation include
Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007), who model and estimate a dynamic child quality production func-
tion for cognitive skills to show the importance of both lagged and contemporaneous inputs on
the production of current skills.
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and Wiswall (2014) estimate a production technology of child cognitive ability
within an explicit model of household choices. Time inputs (both maternal and
paternal) are found to be more important than monetary expenses in the child
development process. Financial constraints matter more (and monetary trans-
fers to a family are more effective) towards the end of the development process
during adolescence. Attanasio et al. (2018) exploit a randomized early childhood
intervention in Colombia to estimate the technology of skill acquisition. Con-
sistent with Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014), they find that the program led
to positive effects on cognitive and socio-emotional development primarily by
inducing parents to increase their own investment in child development.20
How does the literature on skill formation relate to the economics of parenting
styles? To start, we can view parenting style as yet another input in the produc-
tion of skills, by distinguishing different kinds of interactions between parents
and children. A bigger difference is one of perspective. The literature on skill
formation, for the most part, limits itself to estimating a production technology,
such as equations (10) and (11) in the model used here. The theory of parenting
style outlined in Sections 2 and 3 above, in contrast, formulates a full choice prob-
lem in which both parents and children make optimal decisions, given the envi-
ronment they face. Whereas the skill formation literature primarily asks which
skills children will end up with given inputs, the analysis in Section 3 is about
explaining why parents and children make certain investment decisions. In the
parenting style model, a major part of the impact of parents is not through di-
rect investment (the parental inputs I1 and I2 in (10) and (11)), but through in-
fluencing child’s own investment and choices (x1 and x2) through authoritarian
or authoritative strategies. Combining the two approaches therefore results in a
broader perspective on the role of parents for child development.
Conversely, the insights of the literature on skill formation are relevant for for-
mulating better choice models of parenting style. The empirical analysis above
was limited to broad classifications of types of parenting. In reality, there are
many dimensions to parenting strategies, and parenting evolves over time as the
child develops. For instance, the balance between coercion and persuasion in in-
20See also Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix (2017) for a similar model for cognition and health of
children aged 0-12 in India.
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fluencing children usually varies over time, depending on what is at stake and
how the child’s skills and abilities evolve. A research approach that combines
the findings of the recent literature on skill formation with the choice-based ap-
proach of the literature on parenting styles should be productive for providing a
deeper understanding of such issues. An explicit model of optimizing behavior
of parents and children is also helpful for characterizing how decisions respond
to public inputs; for example, in places where excellent public schools exist and
schools do not rely on additional investment at home (e.g., there is little home-
work), parents can relax more compared to places without such features. Lastly,
the environment itself is also, to a large extent, a parental choice. Parents can
decide in which neighborhood to live, who to socialize with, and which schools
their children should attend. This leads to a new set of interactions, which we
explore in the next section.
5 The Interaction of Parenting and Neighborhoods in Child De-
velopment
In the last decades, an extensive and multidisciplinary literature has studied
the importance of neighborhoods in shaping an individual’s life opportunities.21
Most of the research focuses on children and, especially, children living in poor
and distressed areas. Neighborhoods play an important role in part because, es-
pecially for older children, much of human capital accumulation takes place in
schools, which may vary in quality and organization. Broadly defined neighbor-
hoods also matter because they define the set of labor market opportunities that
children face. Most young people start working in the same commuting zone
where they grew up. This affects the incentives for parents to adopt different
parenting styles and to invest in their skill formation.
More generally, the developmental psychology literature has long pointed out
the importance of peers for child development. This is especially true for older
children during adolescence, when attachment to parents is loosened and rela-
tionships with peers take center stage. These observations do not imply that par-
21See Jencks and Mayer (1990) and Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley (2002) for reviews
of neighborhood effects.
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ents no longer matter once a child enters adolescence; rather, the way in which
a parents influence their children shifts gradually from direct interactions to the
parents’ influence on the environment in which children live. For this reason, an
encompassing theory of the economics of parenting should take account of how
parents help determine the peers that their children interact with, the schools
that they attend, and the neighborhoods that they live in. We first discuss these
issues from an empirical perspective, focusing on neighborhood effects in child
development. We then outline how a choice of the child’s environment can be
incorporated in more general models of the economics of parenting.
5.1 Empirical Evidence on Neighborhood Effects in Child Development
Children who grow up in distressed areas tend to reach lower outcomes and
display less upward mobility when compared to children from wealthier areas
(Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Chetty et al. 2014). This styl-
ized fact makes the analysis of neighborhood and peer effects a key point of the-
ories of social capital accumulation (Coleman 1988) and human capital externali-
ties and growth (Benabou 1993; Lucas 1988).22 One potential explanation under-
lying neighborhoods effects (Wilson 1987; Akerlof 1997; Glaeser and Scheinkman
2001) is that children in better neighborhoods are exposed to adults acting as role
models who shape. Social networks and peer effects also play a role. For exam-
ple, higher-income peers may have more information about labor market oppor-
tunities to be shared with the surrounding children (once grown up) and their
parents (Manski 2000; Durlauf 1996). Neighborhoods may also affect the human
capital accumulation process through community resources such as schools or
libraries (Jencks and Mayer 1990).
The empirical study of neighborhood effects is a challenging task. If people’s
location choices are driven in part by unobservable characteristics, measured
neighborhood effects based on observational data do not have a causal interpre-
tation. One way to overcome this issue is to look at policies and interventions that
22Regarding the importance of peer effects, social interactions, and neighborhood effects see
also Case and Katz (1991), Borjas (1995), and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). Econo-
metric issues that arise when there are unobserved neighborhood and individual characteristics
in the presence of sorting are addressed in Altonji and Mansfield (2018) and Agrawal, Altonji,
and Mansfield (2019).
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induce experimental or quasi-experimental relocation of families. Perhaps the
most studied intervention in this context is the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
experiment of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. In the
mid-1990s, the MTO program offered vouchers to a randomly selected groups of
families living in high-poverty housing projects that allowed them to relocate to
areas with lower poverty rates. The experiment took place in the cities of Balti-
more, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Relocation generated large
variation in neighborhood composition for otherwise similar families.23
Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) analyze the short-run impacts of the MTO in the
city of Boston. While individual economic self-sufficiency was unaffected by the
displacement of families from higher to lower poverty areas, treated families ex-
perienced improvements in quality of life factors such as health, safety, and chil-
dren’s behavioral outcomes. Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) extend the analysis
to all five cities involved in the MTO experiment, and confirm the absence of ef-
fects on economic self-sufficiency.24 However, unlike in the Boston-only study,
adult physical health did not improve in response to the intervention. Other out-
comes for youths (such as health and risky behaviors) were differentially affected
by gender. Heterogeneous effects of the MTO experiment also arise in the analy-
sis of youth crime and delinquency in Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005). Ludwig
et al. (2012, 2013) focus on longer-term outcomes and show the MTO experiment
positively affected adult mental and physical health and subjective well-being,
whereas the impact on economic self-sufficiency or child achievement in educa-
tion was negligible.
One explanation for the limited measured impact of the MTO experiment is that
not only neighborhood characteristics matter, but also when and how long one
has lived there. Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016) study the duration of exposure
to a new neighborhood as a possible determinant of long-term effects on chil-
dren.25 They find that: (i) moving to a lower-poverty area improves long-term
23Sanbonmatsu et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive description of the MTO experiment.
24These results are consistent with Oreopoulos (2003), who exploits differences in neighbor-
hood quality of housing projects in Toronto to show little role for neighborhood effects in de-
termining youths’ long-term earnings, unemployment status, and dependence on the welfare
system.
25Long-term outcomes of disadvantaged children relocated to lower-poverty areas are also the
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outcomes of those children who moved at young ages; (ii) the positive effect
induced by the move tend to decline with a child’s age at move; and (iii) individ-
uals moving during adolescence report negative outcomes induced by the move.
Specifically, children moving to less poor areas before the age of 13 considerably
increase their earnings in the mid-twenties, are more likely to attend a college
(and also a better college), are less likely to live in high-poverty areas, and (for
women) are less likely to be single mothers. Conversely, moving when the child
is between age 13–18 has small or even negative effects on a child’s future out-
comes. This finding suggests that the cost of moving (e.g., disruption of social
networks and friendships) weighs more heavily once a child has reached adoles-
cence.
The importance of childhood exposure to neighborhoods is further investigated
in recent papers studying tax records of millions of US families moving across
different areas (Chetty and Hendren 2018a, 2018b). Motivated by evidence that a
child’s income conditional on parents’ income varies substantially with the area
in which the child grew up (Chetty et al. 2014), Chetty and Hendren (2018a) ex-
ploit variation in the age of children when a family moves from one commuting
zone to another to estimate the impact of neighborhoods on intergenerational
mobility.26 They find that “on average, spending an additional year in a com-
muting zone where the mean income rank of children of permanent residents is
1 percentile higher (at a given level of parental income) increases a child’s income
rank in adulthood by approximately 0.04 percentiles.”27
Chetty and Hendren (2018b) examine the causal effect of each county in the US
on children’s outcomes in adulthood to provide insights about the mechanism
object of study of Chyn (2018). By exploiting public housing demolition in Chicago during the
1990s, the study shows that moving out of disadvantaged neighborhoods increased a child’s
employment and earnings in adulthood and reduced arrests for violent crimes.
26The causal interpretation of their results relies on the assumption that the selection effect
(e.g., a child’s unobservable characteristics) associated with a move to a better neighborhood is
invariant with respect to the child’s age at the time of the move.
27Interestingly, while in the Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016) study of the MTO experiment
only young children benefit from a better neighborhood, in Chetty and Hendren (2018a) the
neighborhood effect persists until an individual reaches the early twenties. The difference can
be rationalized as a consequence of the two different settings: in the MTO experiment movers are
compared to non-movers, while Chetty and Hendren (2018a) compare movers across different
commuting zones, which nets out fixed disruption costs of moving.
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underlying neighborhood effects. Previous analyses by Sampson, Morenoff, and
Gannon-Rowley (2002) and Chetty et al. (2014) show correlations between up-
ward mobility and factors such as residential segregation, income inequality,
demographic characteristics (fraction of single mothers and racial composition),
and the availability of good primary schools. Although these correlations are
informative, they fail to disentangle the causal effect of a specific neighborhood
from endogenous sorting. The evidence in Chetty and Hendren (2018b) sug-
gests that the association between upward mobility and group-level characteris-
tics such as racial and income segregation or income inequality are mostly driven
by the direct effect of neighborhoods, whereas the relation between upward mo-
bility and average individual-level characteristics (such as family structure) are
due to sorting.
Summing up, the literature suggests that neighborhoods are important determi-
nants of a child’s future opportunities. The understanding of the mechanisms
underlying neighborhood effects remains a research priority.28
5.2 Neighborhood Choice in a Model of Parenting
From the perspective of the economics of parenting, the results of this literature
suggest that parents have a major impact on their children through determin-
ing their environment, including (but not limited to) the choice of which neigh-
borhood to live in. To date, there is little work from a modeling perspective of
neighborhood choice as an aspect of parenting, and none that considers how this
important dimension of parenting interacts with other parenting choices, such
as that of a parenting style. Eckert and Kleineberg (2019) estimate a model of
neighborhood choice where the value of the neighborhood is exogenous (and es-
timated). In Fogli and Guerrieri (2018), endogenous neighborhood effects arise
from a human capital spillover. Agostinelli (2018) estimates a dynamic model
of skill formation where children choose their own peer groups, and parental
28Another recent contribution to this issue is Gibbons et al. (2013, 2017), who study the deter-
minants of students’ educational outcomes in England using a model with neighborhood fixed
effects. Neighborhood composition is found to play only a limited role for teenagers’ test scores,
whereas turnover of same-school-grade students reduces value added for students who stay in
their original neighborhood.
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investments respond to the children’s peer groups (although the choice of neigh-
borhood is not modeled). In our ongoing work Agostinelli et al. (2019), we de-
velop a model of endogenous neighborhood choice and endogenous neighbor-
hood characteristics within a theory of parenting along the lines of the model
described in Section 2.
In Agostinelli et al. (2019), there are explicit peer effects and there is endogenous
sorting due to endogenous rental costs. To outline the main ideas, consider a ver-
sion of the model described in Section 2 in which there are two neighborhoods,
P (posh) and B (bohemian). Hence, the neighborhood variable dt that enters the
technology of skill formation (6) and (7) satisfies dt ∈ {P,B}. Rental prices q(dt)
which enter the budget constraint (5) may differ across these neighborhoods. The
new element is that neighborhood choice and neighborhood quality are endoge-
nous.
In choosing a neighborhood, parents consider their own preferences, the qual-
ity of the neighborhood as a place to raise children, and the cost of living in the
neighborhood. Parents’ own preferences are determined by a random preference
shock for neighborhoods. For instance, parents may have a preference for the
neighborhood in which they grew up. The quality of the neighborhood is driven
by peer effects. As a simple example, suppose the quality of the neighborhood
depends on the average skills S of the adult residents. In more elaborate formu-
lations, neighborhood quality can also depend on local public goods, parents’
investments I , and the skills s and educational effort x of the local children, that
is, peer effects.
The model implies that both parenting and neighborhood choice interact with
economic conditions. The model displays a force towards economic segregation:
richer parents are more willing and more able to pay high rents in order to pro-
vide their children with a good environment. In the basic model, the strength of
this force depends primarily on inequality. Consider, first, an environment with
low inequality, which could be modeled as a low ratiowH/wL in the setup used in
Section 3.2. The equilibrium will display some segregation, but only to a limited
extent. In particular, there will be one neighborhood where rich people are more
likely to live, and another that has more poor people. The poorer households are
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deterred from the rich neighborhood due to higher rental costs. Nevertheless,
with low inequality the degree of sorting will also be low. If inequality is low, so
are the stakes in getting the best possible education for the children. Hence, pro-
viding the best possible environment for the children is a relatively weak force in
choosing the neighborhood, and for many parents their preference shock (which
is uncorrelated with status) will drive the choice. The difference in the rental
price across the neighborhoods will also be low, again because parents have a
limited willingness to pay for a better environment for their children.
Now consider the same economy but with higher inequality. Parents will now be
more concerned about their children’s skill accumulation, and consequently the
willingness to pay for a better neighborhood goes up. The result is more segrega-
tion: there will be less mixing between rich and poor people, and the difference
in the rental cost between the neighborhoods will increase. Notice that while here
we consider the underlying inequality as an exogenous force, spatial sorting has
a self-reinforcing element. As the rich and poor become more separated, the dif-
ference in the educational environment in the two neighborhoods (which, recall,
we relate to the average skill level S of the local population) will also increase.
This further increases the willingness of the rich to pay for living in the better
neighborhood.
Another self-reinforcing mechanism works through parents’ investments in their
children’s skill accumulation. If neighborhood quality and parental investments
are complementary, increased segregation leads to even stronger parenting in-
vestments among the rich, and less investment among the poor in the disadvan-
taged neighborhood. Such complementarities can arise from a variety of sources.
For example, when children have many peers who are strongly focused on edu-
cational achievement, they may be more receptive to their parents’ efforts com-
pared to an environment where the peer group shows little interest in school.
There are also interactions with the choice of parenting style. For instance, in
poor and crime-ridden neighborhoods parents are likely to emphasize risk aver-
sion, since many of the risks that are present in the environment (such as juvenile
crime and drugs) can have harmful long-term consequences. A side effect is that
the children may end up so risk averse that they are less inclined to jump on eco-
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nomic opportunities that involve some risk taking. In contrast, in safer middle-
class environments parents can afford to be more permissive and risk tolerant,
which translates into a more positive attitude of children towards opportunities
that present some upside risk.
This discussion shows that even a relatively simple model of neighborhood choice
and parenting based on the simple framework presented in Section 2 can address
many of the trends over recent decades that we discussed earlier, such as the in-
crease in economic inequality, rising residential segregation, and a rising gap in
parental investments between families from different ends of the social spectrum.
A better understanding of the mutual interactions that give rise to these trends
will be helpful in formulating policy responses that can be used to prevent these
trends from accelerating further.
6 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
The economics of parenting has come a long way since the family first entered
the realm of economics with the work of Gary Becker. Economic models turn
out to be remarkably successful at explaining many dimensions of what parents
do, ranging from fertility choice (which we did not discuss in detail here) and
parenting style to the choice of a neighborhood for the family to live. There has
also been tremendous progress on understanding the technology of children’s
skill formation. The findings of this literature already play a crucial role in pol-
icy making; for example, the observation that many important skills are acquired
during the first years of life has led to calls for more support for high-quality
daycare and preschool, which is now being implemented in many places. As
this example shows, the economics of parenting takes a central place in some
major policy challenges of this age. Rising inequality, increased segregation, low
social mobility, and more generally increased polarization in society are trends
that most industrialized countries confront today. Further research on the eco-
nomics of parenting will help advance our understanding of the root causes of
these trends, and can clarify options for public policy to address the resulting
challenges.
There are many remaining research challenges for the economics of parenting.
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One example is the measurement of parenting styles. Existing measures, which
derive from developmental psychology, only provide a broad classification, and
different approaches can be incompatible with each other. It would be fruitful
to combine detailed time-use data with other information on the relationships of
parents and children to construct more finely graded measures that map more
directly into economic models of parenting.
A broader challenge for future work is to combine the three strands of research on
the economics of parenting discussed here. Until now, the economics of parent-
ing style, the technology of skill formation, and the role of neighborhood effects
have been mostly studied in isolation. But clearly these dimensions are closely
related: parenting style is a crucial input in skill formation, and so is the choice
of a neighborhood. Conversely, the neighborhood in which a family lives, and
hence the risks and opportunities that a child is exposed to, matter for the choice
of a parenting style. One recent paper that combines two of these elements is
Deckers et al. (2017), who relate socio-economic differences among children in
IQ, patience, and other economic preferences to parental and family character-
istics, parental time investments, and parenting style, and show that parenting
style and time investments play distinct roles. There is a lot of scope for future
work that takes interactions between the different aspects of the economics of
parenting into account.
Another limitation of existing research is that most theoretical models of parent-
child interaction focus on the case of a single parent and a single child. In reality
there are two biological parents, but many children live with a single parent, and
stepparents are also present in many families. It would be fruitful to take more ac-
count of interactions between multiple parents and caregivers in economic mod-
els of parenting. Likewise, in many families there are multiple children, and we
know from empirical work that birth order is an important determinant of chil-
dren’s outcomes (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005). For parents, it quickly
becomes apparent that the choice of parenting style for, say, the third child is
more constrained than for the first, given the competing needs of the older chil-
dren (see Hao, Hotz, and Jin 2008). Children also come with their own person-
alities (and genders), and parents use different strategies with different children
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in response to their characteristics. A lot of productive research could be done
extending theoretical models of parenting beyond the single-parent, single-child
case to capture the multifaceted interactions between many family members.29
Beyond refining the economics of parenting, more research is also needed to as-
sess the implications of changes in parenting for broader economic issues. For
example, if parenting gets more time-intensive, we might expect fertility rates to
fall. The general relationship between investment in children and fertility is a
major topic in the economics of fertility (i.e., the quantity-quality tradeoff), but
we are not aware of work that makes a direct connection between a rising inten-
sity of parenting and the currently very low fertility rates in many industrialized
countries (Doepke and Kindermann 2018), that reconsiders the income-fertility
gradient from the perspective of parenting decisions, or that formulates a joint
decision problem involving fertility and parenting style. Parenting also interacts
with labor supply and careers, especially for mothers (Adda, Dustmann, and
Stevens 2017). Recent research on the gender wage gap has identified mother-
hood as the primary reason for why women still get paid less than men (Kleven,
Landais, and Søgaard 2018, Gallen 2018). For the impact of parenthood on ca-
reers, choices such as parenting style and time use on parenting are surely im-
portant, which is another connection not yet explored in the literature.
Lastly, given the central role of parenting for the accumulation of skills and hu-
man capital, the economics of parenting is highly relevant for macroeconomic
issues such the dynamics of inequality, intergenerational mobility, and overall
economic growth. There are only few papers that take recent advances in re-
search on the technology of skill formation into account while developing multi-
generation models to study determinants of the intergenerational transmission of
economic status (Yum 2015, Caucutt and Lochner 2017, Lee and Seshadri 2019).
We are aware of only a single paper, namely Daruich (2018), that examines the
importance of early investments in children, a major theme in literature on the
technology of skill formation, for the evolution of inequality and growth in a
dynamic macroeconomic model. In the future, we expect that macroeconomic
29Two recent examples of work along these lines are Blandin and Herrington (2018), who con-
sider the impact of family structure and early family investments on college completion rates, and
Gayle, Golan, and Soytas (2015), who analyze racial differences in human capital accumulation.
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modeling will be one of the areas to particularly benefit from ongoing research
on the economics of parenting.
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